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Law, Anarchy and History
By GRANT GILMORE
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School
(The principal address at the Annual Banquet of The University
of Chicago Law Review, May 5, 1966.)
This seems to be the anarchists' spring. This is the spring
when all over the world people described as students
have been marching with banners in angry protest against
whatever is. This is the spring when all the people under
thirty have decided that no one over thirty should ever
be listened to-which must leave people who are just
turning thirty, like Professor Staughton Lynd of Yale, in
an immense hurry to say what they have to say before
they cross the great divide and are never heard from
(Continued on page 5)
Grant Gilmore
Judicial Clerkships
Mr. Phillip E. Johnson, JD'65, has been appointed law
clerk to the Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of
the United States. During the past year, Mr. Johnson
has been law clerk to the Honorable Roger J. Traynor,
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
Most practicing lawyers and law teachers are agreed
that a year's service as law clerk to a judge is one of the
most valuable experiences a young lawyer can have. In
recent years, between fifteen and twenty members of
each graduating class of 125 or so, have had the oppor­
tunity to extend their education in this manner. The
records show great variety as to individual judges served,
geographic location, and nature of courts involved. The
members of the Class of 1965 who served as law clerks in
the year just past were:
ALEC P. BOUXSEIN. Clerk to The Honorable Richard
B. Austin, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
BRUCE J. ENNIS, JR. Clerk to The Honorable William
Miller, U.S. District Court, Nashville, Tennessee.
HENRY F. FIELD. Clerk to The Honorable Walter V.
Schaefer, Supreme Court of Illinois, Chicago and
Springfield.
ROBERT J. GOLDBERG. Clerk to The Honorable Thomas E.
Kluczynski, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
MICHAEL GORDON. Clerk to The Honorable Walter L.
Pope, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, San Fran­
cisco.
CARL A. HATCH. Clerk to The Honorable John C. Harri­
son, Supreme Court of Montana, Helena.
PHILLIP E. JOHNSON. Clerk to The Honorable Roger J.
Traynor, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California,
San Francisco.
CHESTER T. KAMIN. Clerk to The Honorable Ulysses S.
Schwartz, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
MICHAEL B. LAVINSKY. Clerk to The Honorable John
Pickett, U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, Denver.
MERLE W. LOPER. Clerk to The Honorable Jesse E. Esch­
bach, U.S. District Court, Fort Wayne, Indiana.
(Continued on page 2)
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BURRIL L. PRESTON. Clerk to The Honorable Hall S.
Lusk, Supreme Court of Oregon, Salem.
TOM A. ROTHSCHILD. Clerk to The Honorable James B.
Parsons, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
ALAN H. SALTZMAN, Clerk to The Honorable Matthew
Tobriner, Supreme Court of California, San Francisco.
MICHAEL G. SCHNEIDERMAN. Clerk to The Honorable
Bernard M. Decker, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
MILTON R. SCHROEDER. Clerk to The Honorable Carl
McGowan, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Washington.
TERRY J. SMITH. Clerk to The Honorable John W. Fitz­
gerald, Michigan Court of Appeals, Lansing.
WILLIAM C. SNOUFFER. Clerk to The Honorable Ralph
M. Holman, Supreme Court of Oregon, Salem.
JOHN L. WEINBERG. Clerk to The Honorable Henry L.
Burman, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
WILLIAM A. ZOLLA. Clerk to The Honorable Ulysses S.
Schwartz, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
As of this writing, the following members of the Class
of 1966, and three other recent graduates, had begun
their work as law clerks to judges: .
ROBERT M. BERGER. Clerk to The Honorable Henry J.
Friendly, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, New
York.
NICHOLAS J. BOSEN. Clerk to The Honorable James A.
Bryant, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
ROLAND E. BRANDEL. Clerk to The Honorable Roger J.
Traynor, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California,
San Francisco.
BASIL G. CONDOS, JD'6S. Clerk to The Honorable Walter
J. Cummings, Ir., U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Cir­
cuit, Chicago.
SEYMOUR H. DUSSMAN, JD'6S. Clerk to The Honorable
F. Ryan Duffy, U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
Chicago.
JOHN FALBY, JD'64. Clerk to The Honorable William M.
McAllister, Supreme Court of Oregon, Salem.
LYN I. GOLDBERG. Clerk to The Honorable Edwin A.
Robson, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
Mr. Goldberg and Judge Kluczynski
JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS. Clerk to The Honorable Hubert L.
Will, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
HENRY C. KRASNOW. Clerk to The Honorable James B.
Parsons, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
DAVID C. LANDGRAF. Clerk to The Honorable Bernard M.
Decker, U.S. District Court, Chicago.
RocLYNE E. LAPORTE. Clerk to The Honorable Henry L.
Burman, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
RICHARD E. POOLE. Clerk to The Honorable Collins J.
Seitz, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, Phila­
delphia.
GEORGE A. RANNEY, JR. Clerk to The Honorable Carl
McGowan, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Washington.
LAWRENCE H. SCHWARTZ. Clerk to The Honorable Morris
Miller, Juvenile Court, Washington.
MICHAEL L. SHAKMAN. Clerk to The Honorable Walter
V. Schaefer, Supreme Court of Illinois, Chicago.
RICHARD G. SINGER. Clerk to The Honorable Harrison L.
Winter, U.S. District Court, Baltimore.
RALPH D. STERN. Clerk to The Honorable Arthur J. Mur­
phy, Illinois Appellate Court, Chicago.
Justice Holman with Mr. Snouffer
Justice Lusk and Mr. Preston
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Judge Decker and Mr. Schneiderman
Judge Fitzgerald and Mr. Smith
Justice Henry L. Burman holds a reunion with his clerks for the
past four years. Left to right: the Justice, John L. Weinberg, JD'65;
Frederick E. Breen, JD'64; Stewart H. Diamond, JD'63, and John
Janewicz, JD'62.
Gerhard Casper
Professor Casper Appointed
The Record takes great pleasure in noting the appoint­
ment of Associate Professor Gerhard Casper, whose
principal field is comparative law. A native of Germany,
Mr. Casper studied at the Universities of Freiburg and
Hamburg, passing his State Legal Examination (Refer­
endar) in 1961. He received the Master of Laws degree
from the Yale Law School a year later. He has since
been awarded the degree of Doctor iuris utriusque (Doc­
tor of civil and canon law) by the University of Frei­
burg. His doctoral dissertation, "Legal Realism and
Value Orientation in American Legal Thought," was
recently published in Germany.
For the past two years, Mr. Casper has been a mem­
ber of the Faculties of Political Science and of Law at
the University of California at Berkeley. At Chicago
he will teach courses in Comparative Law, Jurisprudence,
and Constitutional Law.
He is married to the former Regina Kosche1, a Doc­
tor of Medicine, who will be interning at Michael Reese
Hospital.
The appointment of Professor Casper, who has al­
ready established a reputation as a legal scholar, is in
keeping with the strong tradition of emphasis on Com-
_,
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parative and Foreign Law at The University of Chicago
Law School. Professor Casper will add to the strength
of the Faculty in a field in which it is already represented
by Max Rheinstein, the Max Pam Professor of Com­
parative Law, a world-renowned scholar. The Max Pam
Professorship, held by Professor Rheinstein since its es­
tablishment, was the first chair in Comparative Law in
an American university.
Bigelow Fellows
In describing the First Year Tutorial Program, the
School's Announcements state: "All first-year students
perform individual assignments in a tutorial program
conducted under the direction of a member of the fa­
culty. In this program each student is assigned to a
tutor, who is one of the Bigelow Teaching Fellows.
The tutorial work emphasizes training in research, in
the preparation of legal memoranda and other forms
of legal writing, and in oral argument. Several of the
assignments each year are based upon problems current­
ly presented in actual cases, both trial and appellate,
which are heard in the Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom
of the Law School before courts of Illinois."
The program, a major innovation in legal education,
was established at the School in 1938. The Teaching
Fellowships are named in honor of HARRY A. BIGELOW,
who was a member of the Law Faculty from 1904 until
1940, and Dean of the School from 1930 until 1940.
In the academic year 1966-67, the Tutorial Program
will be directed by Professor DAVID P. CURRIE. The Fel­
lows will be:
MICHAEL G. SCHNEIDERMAN, B.A., Antioch College, 1962,
J.D., The University of Chicago, 1965. Mr. Schneider­
man, who will serve as Senior Bigelow Fellow, has spent
the year since his graduation as law clerk to THE HON­
ORABLE BERNARD M. DECKER, U.S. District Court, Chi­
cago.
JEFFREY M. EpSTEIN, A.B., Amherst College, 1962,
LL.B., Harvard University, 1965. Mr. Epstein has served
as law clerk to THE HONORABLE HARRY E. KALODNER,
Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
PETER G. HEFFEY, LL.B. (Hons.), University of Mel­
bourne, 1963. Mr. Hefley, who is a Barrister and Solici­
tor, has practiced law in Melbourne, and has served as a
Senior Tutor on the Faculty of Law of the University
of Melbourne.
HARVEY S. PERLMAN, B.A., 1963 and J.D., 1966, Univer­
sity of Nebraska. Mr. Perlman, who was Editor-in-Chief
of The Nebraska Law Review and was graduated first
in his class, will return to teach at the University of
Nebraska College of Law following his year at Chicago.
SHELDON H. ROODMAN, B.A., University of Michigan,
1963, j.D; Washington University (St. Louis), 1966.
Mr. Roodman was Managing Editor of the Washington
University Law Quarterly and was graduated first in
his class.
GEOFFERY P. SHAW, B.A., Oxford University, 1965.
(B.c.L. anticipated at about the time this article goes
to press.) Mr. Shaw, who was at Worcester College,
expects to practice at the English Bar after the conclusion
of his year at Chicago.
Alumni Notes
LESTER R. URETZ, JD'48, has been appointed Chief Coun­
sel of the United States Internal Revenue Service.
On the same day, his classmate, MILTON SEMER, was
appointed Counsel to the President of the United States.
Mr. Semer had been serving as General Counsel of the
Housing and Home Finance Agency.
EDWARD H. LEVI, JD'35, Professor of Law and Provost
of the University of Chicago, and also, of course, former
Dean of the Law School, has been elected to the Board
of Trustees of the University.
Two graduates of the School were cited by the Uni­
versity of Chicago Alumni Association for civic leader­
ship and community service. THE HONORABLE HUBERT
L. WILL, JD'37, is Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. Judge Will has been
Chairman of Chicago's Committee on Youth Welfare,
a member of the International Council of the WorId
Veterans Association, a member of the National Board
of the American Veterans Committee, a Director of
the Illinois Humane Society, the Foundation for Emo­
tionally Disturbed Children and the Americans for
Democratic Action. He was one of the founders of the
South East Chicago Commission.
THOMAS L. NICHOLSON, JD'54, M.C.L., '59, is a member
of the Chicago firm of Isham, Lincoln and Beale, He
is President of the Metropolitan Housing and Planning
Council of Chicago. As Vice-President of the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, he was the Director of
the Ninth Biennial Conference of the U.S. National
Commission for UNESCO. Both Judge Will and Mr.
Nicholson are members of the Board of Directors of the
Law School Alumni Association.
ALAN C. SWAN, JD'S7, has been appointed Assistant
Vice-President for Planning and Development of The
University of Chicago. Mr. Swan practiced with the New
York firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy for
four years, and then served as Assistant General Counsel
of the Agency for International Development.
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Law, Anarchy and History-
(Continued [rom page 1)
again. This is surely the spring when all the people over
thirty have given up even pretending to understand what
is going on. There are of course the pundits of the Great
Society who make a profession of explaining the truth of
the matter-but I dare say that no one paid much atten­
tion to them, even as far back as last spring.
My own generation, in its youth, went through what
was then conceived to be a period of revolutionary fer­
ment. The Great Depression of the 1930's, which was our
dearest intellectual possession, had taught us that Society
-it was not yet the Great Society-must be rebuilt.
Wherever we clustered, from right to left of the political
spectrum, we were all rebuilders. The one article of faith
which no one questioned was that you must have clearly
in mind, before you started the demolition, what you pro­
posed to put in the place of the structure you were getting
rid of. There was to be no destruction just for the dread­
ful joy of seeing things go up in smoke, the awful ecstasy
of seeing them come tumbling down in ruins. We knew
that, in the great nineteenth century debate between
Marx and Bakunin, Marx had triumphed. You had to
have what came to be called an ideology. In this sense
the president of General Motors was every bit as good a
Marxist as the chairman of the Communist Party-al­
though it is true that the details of their ideologies were
not at all points in agreement.
But this year, I take it, ideologies are for the birds and
we are all for the dreadful joy and the awful ecstasy.
There was a French anarchist who, as he was being led
off to execution, told his followers: If you want to be
happy, hang your landlord. There is much to be said for
this, even from the landlord's point of view. It concen­
trates your mind wonderfully, as Dr. Johnson remarked,
to know that you will be hanged tomorrow and a short, .
happy life is on all counts to be preferred to a long, dull
one. Smash now, build later must be our slogan; Back
to Bakunin our watchward.
In this forward-looking Law School, where we pride
ourselves on keeping up with the times, we must set
about constructing an anarchist theory of law, fit for the
season. I have no doubt that the the incoming editors of
the Law Review already have this project well in hand
and that we may confidently look forward to a sym­
posium issue next fall on The Rule of Law in an An­
archist Society.
Perhaps the most useful contribution that our young
friends can make to our anarchist jurisprudence will be
the destruction of the myth that predictability is what
law, and the study of law, are all about. The myth has
obsessed us ever since Holmes told us, the better part of
a century ago, that what he meant by law was the predic­
tion today of what the courts are going to do tomorrow
based on a study of what the same courts did yesterday.
That is, from a study of the past we ought to be able to
foretell the future. If we know the last decision, we know
the next one too. It is true that Holmes cautioned us,
without explaining what he meant by either term, to pay
more attention to experience than to logic-but that
seemed to mean merely that there is a wrong way, as
well as a right way, of studying the past. If we go about
it the right way, Holmes assured us, we will undoubtedly
pull off the predictability trick.
The nineteenth century historians, of whom Holmes
was a typical representative, were happy optimists­
much as the social scientists are today. Their mission,
which would be accomplished as soon as they had had
time to look through the archives, was simply to tell us,
as a German historian put it, exactly what had happened.
Once that had been done, we would know-although
there remained a central core of ambiguity about what it
was that we would know. From much of the German
writing it appeared that we would know that all history
had been a triumphant progress toward the ideal of
perfection embodied in the Prussian state. Lord Acton
devoted most of a long life to a monumental history,
which he never quite finished, of the idea of freedom and
its progress-an English version of Prussianism. Marx,
and early drop-out from society, became the apostle of a
somewhat different synthesis.
Common to all this writing was the assumption that
everything is a progress toward a predetermined goal.
The inevitability of history became the brooding omni­
presence of the age. What was had to be. Having been so,
it could not have been otherwise. From which it followed
that what will be has already been plotted, the course has
already been set, our destiny is truly written in the stars.
There was, in most versions, one more river to Jordan
but the Promised Land was already in sight.
Historians today have become a sadder, but, I am sure,
a wiser, lot, as perhaps even the sociologists will have
become after another generation or two of seeing
their reach exceed their grasp. Exactly what happened
will never be known, even when the last document
in the last archive has been analyzed in accordance with
the most refined techniques. Except in broadest outline
the past escapes us. There are the bare bones, bleached
white with time-dramatic and terrible events of which
we have heard so often that we believe them to be true­
but it is a madman's folly to try to clothe the dead bones
with living flesh. The inevitability of history has become,
except for a nostalgic Victorian like Toynbee, a series of
unrelated traffic accidents. What was could perfectly well
have been something else. What will be, God, if he is not
already dead, only knows. Knowing who won the last
election, the last war, the last revolution tells us exactly
nothing about the next election, the next war, the next
revolution-except that there will in all probability be
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more wars and more revolutions. Whether there will be
more elections is a closer question. Meanwhile, as an
English poet has remarked,
The situation of our time
Lies round us like an unsolved crime.
An historian is someone who writes about the past.
History is not what happened, but what is written about
what happened, in the past. History is a formal discipline,
like sonnet writing or law. The historian is not absolutely
free to improvise. If he chooses to write about what we
oddly call the middle ages, he must take account of the
fact that Rome fell. But we know so little about what
Rome was or what its fall consisted of that the historian's
imagination has as free a range as the sonneteer's within
his fourteen lines or the lawyer's within his library of
bound reports. Rome fell, we may say, because of corrup­
tion and immorality in high places-which teaches us to
treasure austerity and a high moral tone among our
elected officials. Or Rome's fall represented the triumph
of barbarism and Christianity-which makes us love our
own enlightened rationalism all the more. Or the truth
is that there was a long-continued drought in central and
southern Europe: let us keep our irrigation systems in
good repair. Or that a population decline, which began
during the second century of our era, went on until the
Empire no longer had the strength to withstand attack:
there seems to be no particular moral there for us. Or
that a strong central government in China in the third
century drove the barbarian tribes westwards from the
Asian steppes until they poured in helpless terror across
the Roman wall: perhaps a strong Chinese state and civil­
ization in the rest of the world are incompatible. And
there are a good many other theories which have been
put forward at one time or another to explain why Rome
fell-if indeed it did fall.
History, let us conclude, is a systematic distortion of
the past, designed to tell us something meaningful about
the present.
As lawyers, we are all historians, whether we like it or
not. Weare bound to a discipline which requires us to
justify whatever is to be done now on the ground that it
resembles something that has been done in the past. We
must search out the precedents. We must ascertain the
true intent of the legislature. The lawyer's insistence that
nothing absolutely new can ever be allowed is, I am sure,
socially useful: it acts, to some extent, as a brake on prog­
ress and slows down a rate of change which might other­
wise become intolerable. It satisfies a profound psycho­
logical need. Almost the first legal business of any success­
ful revolution is to legitimatize the new regime-which
is mostly a matter of proving that the revolution changed
nothing but merely recognized what had in fact already
taken place. The proof, indeed, is usually persuasive.
But, since we must be historians, let us try to be good
historians. Let us stop pretending that from the past we
can predict the future. Let us stop teaching students that
the point of studying cases is to guess how the next case
is going to come out. The point of studying cases is the
same as the point of studying why Rome fell. For one
thing the cases, like the fall of Rome, are in themselves
intellectually fascinating. It is fashionable in some circles
today to heap contempt on what is called merely narra­
tive history-I think that the contempt is largely over­
done. A good story has never been a waste of anyone's
time. For another thing, given the necessary inadequacy
of our knowledge, there is-there always will be-room
for an infinite number of hypotheses about what went on
and why it went on and what caused it to move in the
implausible direction it did rather than in the plausible
direction it didn't. Our hypotheses never tell us what is
going to happen next. They tell us about patterns of re­
sponse to circumstance. They give us a reason for argu­
ing that, at this juncture, we ought to do this, rather
than that. They give us a way of channeling our behavior
so that it will be something more than helpless panic or
random improvisation. A chess-player knows what he
plans to do next if his opponent makes the move that is
expected of him. If his opponent makes an unexpected
move, he maybe wise to change his plan and do some­
thing else. The more carefully he has studied the cele­
brated games of the past, the better equipped he will be
to adjust, quickly and confidently and rationally and
flexibly, to the new situation. He has something to go on.
And that is the point of studying cases.
Let us also, as good historians, stop pretending that
once we have learned all the facts about everything-or
even all the facts about anything-we shall be in a posi­
tion to control our destinies or make the world a green
and pleasant place or even do our opponents in the eye.
Fact-gathering is a comforting occupation: it makes us
feel scientific and the more facts we gather the more sci­
entific we feel. The number of facts one man can gather
in a lifetime is sadly limited. Therefore we must have
teams to do cooperative research. We must have research
institutes. We must have squads and platoons of research
assistants. Vve must have batteries of computers. We
must pile up the facts until they reach the sky. And when
they have reached the sky, we shall sadly discover that
our arduous and expensive labors have been for naught.
Last year's fact is no more helpful than yesterday's news­
paper. Nothing so obscures vision as too many facts,
dancing like spots before our eyes. Facts give us, not
truth, but the illusion of truth, and those who know they
are right have always done a great deal of harm in the
world and always will. The facts, or the fancies, which
one man can harvest, unaided, are the limit of wisdom.
Let us, finally, stop pretending that the law is more
than it is. Let us stop talking, each May Day, about the
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Rule of Law in a Democratic Society-as if all the good
things we like to think we have in our way of life come
from a strict observance of the positive law and as if the
more law we have the more democratic we will be. Let
us stop talking about WorId Peace through Law: con­
ceivably we might get World Law through Peace-r-ef
which there appears to be little present prospect-but not
The Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, 1965-66, left
to right: George A. Ranney, Jr., Chicago; Barbara J. Hillman, Chi­
cago; David C. Long, Chicago, Chairman; Sherwin S. Kaplan,
Chicago; and John C. Cratsley, Swarthmore, Pa.
The officers of the Student Legal Aid Association for 1965-66,
left to right: Karl R. Barnickol, Chicago, 2nd Vice-President;
Ralph C. Brendes, Alton, N.Y., President, and Melvin B. Gold­
berg, St. Paul, Minn., 1st Vice-President.
the other way around. The law-our system of law-is
wonderful enough as it is without being packaged like a
television commercial to show how much better it is than
poor old Brand X. Law never creates society; society cre­
ates law. Law never makes society better; a better soci­
ety will improve the law.
Law is not a positive good; it is a necessary evil. In
Utopia there will be no law. The lion will lie down with
the lamb and the forms of action will not longer rule us
from the grave. Happily for us, no doubt, Utopia is not
yet in sight and we shall have need of law even after we
have turned the next corner. But we may judge of the
excellence of our society not by how much law we have
but by how little we can make do with.
Law is our attempt to control the chaotic and exuber­
ant spontaneity of life. Law is formal, rigid, analytical,
rational. Law is, as we say, a discipline. Life is undisci­
plined, irrational and forever overflowing the banks and
dikes we have built to contain it. The study of law, I tell
my students, tends to corrupt what is human in us; the
ideal lawyer would have left his humanity quite behind.
We shall be wise to stop well short of that bleak goal.
In constructing our new jurisprudence for the season,
let us be careful to reserve a part for life. The demonstra­
tions of this troubled, but not uninteresting, spring
should serve to remind us that reason, which is our stock
in trade, has never been enough. A wise lawyer once said
to me that he had concluded, after a lifetime of observa­
tion, that all outstandingly successful men are insane.
Their insanity is, indeed, their most precious asset. If
they had not been insane, they would have been like the
rest of us. The lawyer's function, therefore, when he
counsels such a man, is to try to make sure that his client
does not go quite off the rails, without doing anything to
cure or curb the insanity which is the secret of his suc­
cess. Weare-all of us-by our profession, the purveyors
of reason to a world that is unreasonable, if not insane.
We try to impose a degree of order on the swirling chaos.
We perform a necessary, if somewhat disagreeable, task.
By our training we come instinctively to prefer tradition,
continuity and ordered change. But let us bear in mind
that our true function is to preserve, protect and defend
the insanity which, while it terrifies us, is yet our greatest
and our only hope.
My fellow anarchists, I salute you.
Gilmore Honored
GRANT GILMORE, Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago Law School, has been awarded the Ames Prize
for his book, Security Interests in Personal Property. The
catalogue of the Harvard Law School describes this cov­
eted and infrequently awarded prize as follows:
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IN 1898, JULIAN W. MACK, LL.B., 1887, gave three thousand
dollars, which he afterward supplemented to establish the JAMES
BARR AMES PRIZE FUND, "from the income of which a prize of
not less than $400 shall be from time to time awarded for a
meritorious essay or a book on some legal subject."
The Ames Prize is awarded by the Faculty of the Harvard Law
School at intervals of approximately four years for one or more
essays or books on some legal subject written in the English lan­
guage and published not less than one nor more than five years
before the award. It consists of a bronze medal and a sum of not
less than $400.
The following awards of the Ames Prize have been made:
1902: to JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A.B. 1883, LL.B. 1887, LL.D.
1909, for the first volume of his edition of Greenleaf on Evidence.
1906: to FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Downing Professor of
the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge, England,
for three volumes in the Year Book Series of the Selden Society.
1910: to JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, Solicitor General of New
Zealand, for his book on Torts.
1914: to SAMUEL CHARLES WIEL, A.B. 1899, LL.B. 1903, for
the third edition of his book on Water Rights in the Western
States.
1918: to ERNST FREUND, Professor of Law in the University of
Chicago, for his Standards of American Legislation.
1922: to WILLIAM WARWICK BUCKLAND, Regius Professor of
Civil Law in the University of Cambridge, England, for his
Text Book of Roman Law.
.
1926: to WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, Viner ian Professor of
English Law in the University of Oxford, England, for his
History of English Law.
1930: to BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals of New York, for his The Paradoxes of Legal Science.
1938: to JAMES CUMMINGS BON BRIGHT, Professor of Finance in
Columbia University, for his Valuation of Property; and to
ISAIAH LEO SHARFMAN, A.B. 1907, LL.B. 1910, Professor of Eco­
nomics in the University of Michigan, for his volumes on The
Interstate Commerce Commission.
1946: to CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, LL.B. 1898, Hamilton Fish
Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Emeritus, at
Columbia University, for the second edition of his International
Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States,'
and to RANDOLPH EVERNGHIM PAUL, for his Federal Estate and
Gift Taxation.
1950: to ERNST RABEL, Research Associate at the University of
Michigan Law School, for his The Conflict of Laws: A Com­
parative Study, of which two volumes were published in 1945
and 1947; and to LEON RADZINOWICZ, Assistant Director of Re­
search in Criminal Science, Faculty of Law, University of Cam­
bridge, for his A History of English Criminal Law and its Ad­
ministration from 1750, of which the first volume was publishedin 1948.
1954: to ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, Townsend Professor of Law,
Emeritus, at Yale University, for his The Law of Contracts.
1958: to JAMES WILLARD HURST, LL.B. 1935, Professor of Law:
at the University of Wisconsin Law School, for his Law and the
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States,
published in 1956; and to GEORGE OSBORNE SAYLES, Burnett­
Fletcher Professor of History in the University of Aberdeen, for
his Introductions to Volumes I-IV of the Selden Society'S Select
Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward I and Ed­
ward II, Volume IV of which was published in 1957.
1962: to GLANVILLE LLEWELLYN WILLIAMS, Fellow of Jesus
College, University of Cambridge, and University Reader in
English Law, for his second edition of Criminal Law-The Gen­
eral Part, published in 1961.
The Graduate Program
Provision for graduate study beyond the J.D. degree has
been a major element in the work of the Law School for
decades. In recent years there has been a substantial
increase both in the variety of graduate programs and
the number of graduate students. During the academic
year 1966-67, it is expected that fifty-six graduate stu­
dents, from seventeen countries, will be enrolled. The stu­
dents and their programs are:
Commonwealth Fellows (Candidates for J.D. degree):
PETER J. BAYNE, Melbourne, Australia, LL.B., 1965, Uni­
versity of Melbourne.
GEOFFREY W. R. PALMER, Wellington, New Zealand,
LL.B., 1966, Victoria University of Wellington.
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice:
ISRAEL-DAVID LIBAI, Tel Aviv, Master of Law, 1956,
Hebrew University; Candidate for D.C.L. degree.
JAPAN-ATSUSHI NAGASHIMA, B.Jur., 1941, Kyoto Im­
perial University.
u.s.A.-ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, Verona, N. J., J.D., 1966,
The University of Chicago; Candidate for LL.M. de­
gree.
u.s.A.-MELVIN B. GOLDBERG, St. Paul, Minnesota, J.D.,
1966, The University of Chicago; Candidate for LL.M.
degree.
u.s.A.-DAVID L. PASSMAN, Chicago, Class of 1967, The
University of Chicago; Candidate for LL.M. degree (be­
ginning Spring Quarter).
Comparative Law (Candidates for M. Camp. L. degrees):
BELGIUM-FRANZ VAN HOECK, Brussells, Candidat (Law),
1963, 3rd Doctorate of Law, 1966, Catholic University of
Louvain.
FRANCE-JULES-MARC BAUDEL, Paris, Licence en droit,
1960, University of Paris.
FRANCE-PHILLIPE DUPRE, Paris, Graduate Status, 1966,
University of Paris.
FRANCE-MME. PHILLIPE DUPRE, Paris, Graduate Status,
1966, University of Paris.
FRANCE-YVES DE RICHEMONT, Paris, Licence en droit,
1965, University of Paris.
GERMANy-VOLKER DAHLGRUN, Celle, Reverendar, 1961,
University of Wiirzburg; Assessor, 1965, Oberdandes­
gericht Celle.
GERMANy-GERHARD FISCHER, Stiffurstresse, [ur Staats­
prufung, 1965, Eberhard Karls University of Tabingen.
GERMANy-CLAUS-DIETER MEINHARDT, Wiesbaden, Erste
[ur. Staatsprufung, 1965, University of Mainz.
GERMANy-BERND P. RUSTER, Munich, Erste Jur. Staats­
examen, 1966.
GERMANy-WOLFGANG OHNDORF, KencptenjAlls, Erst [ur,
Staatsexamen, 1964, University of Munich.
INDIA-RADHA K. PILLAI, Bombay, LL.M., 1964, Bombay
University, LL.M., 1966, Harvard University.
ISRAEL-NITZA SHAPIRO LIBAI, Tel Aviv, LL.M., 1963,
Hebrew University.
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JAPAN-JUNIJIRO TSUBOTA, LL.M., 1965, University of
Tokyo.
KOREA-YOUNG Moo KIM, Seoul, LL.M., Seoul National
University, 1966.
KOREA-YEAN HI LEE, Seoul, LL.B., 1964, Seoul National
University; M.C.L., 1966, University of Illinois. Candi­
date for D.C.L. degree.
NORWAy-HANS PETTER LUNDGAARD, Oslo, Cando [ur.,
1961, University of Oslo.
SWITZERLAND-VICTOR MUELLER, Aargan, Doktoral, 1966,
University of Zurich.
TURKEy-MEHMET R. ULUC, Istanbul, Licence Diploma,
1963, Istanbul University; M.C.L., 1966, Columbia Uni­
versity. Candidate for D.C.L. degree.
'YUGOSLAVIA-DJURICA KRSTIc, Belgrade, Doctor of Law,
1961, University of Belgrade.
Foreign Law Program
First Year, in Residence at the Law School
ROBERT G. BERGER, Manistique, Michigan, J.D., 1966, The
University of Chicago.
LOREN DARR, Garden City, N.Y., LL.B., 1966, Stanford
University.
KENNETH E. FRIES, Chico, California, LL.B., University
of California, Berkeley.
ROGER J. GEWOLB, Chicago, Illinois, J.D., 1966, Univer­
sity of Illinois.
MONT P. HoYT, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, J.D., 1965,
University of Oklahoma.
DONALD SCHER, Altadena, California, LL.B., 1966, Uni­
versity of California, Los Angeles.
RICHARD J. SCOTT, West Bend, Wisconsin, LL.B., 1966,
University of Wisconsin.
Second Year, in Germany
JAMES L. BILLINGER, Manistique, Michigan, JD., 1964,
University of Denver.
LARRY B. COFFEY, Denver, Colorado, J.D., 1965, Indiana
University.
THEODORE K. FURBER, Minneapolis, Minnesota, LL.B.,
1965, University of Minnesota.
STEPHEN »: GUITTARD, Victoria, Texas, LL.B., 1961, Uni­
versity of Texas.
PETER M. KENNEL, Ingleside, Illinois, LL.B., 1965, Uni­
versity of Illinois.
MELBURN E. LAUNDRY, Berwyn, Illinois, J.D., 1964, Chi­
cago-Kent College of Law.
LEONARD D. LEVIN, Chicago, Illinois, J.D., 1965, The
University of Chicago.
MICHAEL L. LEVINSON, Chicago, Illinois, LL.B., 1965, New
York University .
JOHN E. MULLEN, Winnetka, Illinois, LL.B., 1963, Har­
vard University.
JAN E. UNNA, Hinsdale, Illinois, J.D., 1965, The University
of Chicago.
International Trade and Development Program (Candi­
dates for J .S.D. degree):
JAMES S. GORDON, Chicago, Illinois, LL.B., 1965, Yale Uni­
versity.
PETER P. KARASZ, Washington, D.C., J.D., 1965, The Uni­
versity of Chicago.
Law and Economics Program:
ROBERT J. DONOVAN, Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania, J.D., 1966,The University of Chicago; Candidate for LL.M.
degree.
JOHN L. PETERMAN, Charlottesville, Virginia, PhD., 1964,
University of Virginia (Post-doctoral research fellow).
Candidates for Master of Laws degrees (LL.M.):
S.W.F. AMARASURIYA, Colombo, Ceylon, LL.B., 1954,
University of Ceylon.
ROBERT L. BARD, Buenos Aires, Argentina, LL.B., 1959,
Yale University.
ALLIE DURELL DOUTHIT, Austin, Texas, LL.B., 1961, Uni­
versity of Texas.
DAVID N. GOLDSWEIG, Elizabeth, New Jersey, LL.B., 1966,
.
University of Michigan.
Candidate for Doctor of Laws degree O.S.D.):
KENNETH A. HINNEGAN, London, Ontario, LL.B., 1965,
University of Western Ontario.
Special Research:
BELGlUM-LuDOVIC DE GRYSE, Roseselare, Dokter in de
Rechten, 1961, Catholic University of Louvain (and As­
sistant to Professor Max Rheinstein).
FINLAND-PER-JOHAN LINDHOLM, Helsinki, LL.B., 1961,
LL.M., 1965, University of Helsinki.
FRANCE-REV. MICHAEL HALBECQ, S.J., Vanves, Licence
en droit, 1958, Doctorat Es-Scicnces Politiques, 1962,
University of Paris.
GERMANy-OTTO PRASCHMA, Hohenstein, Erste Jur. Staats­
examen, 1965, University of the Saarland.
The Commonwealth Fellows for 1965-66: Robert J. Coleman,
left, of Plymouth, England, and Harry J. Glasbeek, of Melbourne,
Australia.
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The Many Faces of the Law
By THE HONORABLE CHARLES D. BREITEL
Justice of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York
(The talk which follows was the Lecture to Entering Students,
presented by Justice Breitcl at the opening of the academic year
1965-66.)
Thank you very much, Judge Schaefer, for a magnifi­
cent introduction. If I weren't the rude man that I am
I wouldn't say what I'm going to say, namely, that it
was too magnificent. An introduction, if it is not good,
is a terrible thing. It leaves the speaker before the audi­
ence completely naked, with no foundation upon which
he can proceed and without clothes to hide his obvious
human imperfections. When the introduction is too
good, there is no possibility that he can possibly attain
the expectations that have been raised, so dear friend,
Walter, you've done me too well tonight. I meant what
I said: that was very nice and very touching and espe­
cially coming from Judge Schaefer. This I will tell you,
and I know this is not compliment trading.... There
are three great state judges in this country and they hap­
pen to live and work across the country. There is Tray­
nor of California, there is Fuld of New York and there
is Schaefer of Illinois.
I think it's a marvelous idea to have an entering law
class addressed by someone who is an old man at the
law. I think it's a magnificent idea to have it preceded
by a dinner for all the reasons that Dean Neal told you.
The only trouble is what in heaven's name does the
speaker now say to an entering class? I have a bad
habit of accepting invitations to speak without having
decided what I'm going to speak about. I find it some­
what rewarding sometimes, because in the necessity of
deciding upon what I will speak about, I usually find
it very educational for me, even if the effect on the
audience is not equally rewarding.
So I have said to myself for a long time now, since
I accepted the invitation to speak tonight, what does one
say to an entering class? It's thirty-six years since I was
a member of an entering class, and my memory is dim.
It is a common rule of ordinary, commonplace psychol­
ogy that painful experiences are not recalled easily, and
so I did not know just what it was that an entering
class would like to hear. Worse, I did not know what
an entering class ought to hear, which might be quite
different from what they wish to hear. So, with the legal
training that I have had, which has not been too bad,
I knew that I should do research. So I did. I started
almost at home.
I have a daughter who has been out of law school less
than two years, and as the idea of doing this reserach
came to me on the spur of the moment, I used the tele-
phone. And I said to her, "Eleanor, if you were a mem­
ber of an entering class, it's a short time ago for you,
and I was speaking to that class, what would you want
me to say?" "Oh, my God," she said, "it's useless. Not at
the beginning ... maybe in February." She went on:
"At the beginning they know all the answers. At the
beginning they (the students) have achieved their suc­
cesses in the liberal arts schools, and especially if they've
been admitted to good law schools, they feel they've
made it. They've both achieved at the college level and
they have achieved by admission to their law schools."
You heard what Dean Neal had to say today, this eve­
ning, which confirmed that. He told you this is the best
of all classes the School has ever had, and therefore the
most promising of all classes. You do not have to be
told anything more on this point. She repeated, "Much
better to talk in February." My daughter said also,
"You know, by December confusion will reign. By
December they will be in trouble, but it will still be too
early to talk to them. You'll have to wait for it to settle
a bit." I asked, "What's the confusion about?" She said,
"The chaos in the law, the lack of any system, the pe­
culiarities of the teaching system of law. It just doesn't
make any sense. And for the first time these great
achievers of great successes in the halls of Academe
discover that there is this hopeless, waterless desert be­
fore them and the way out of it does not appear." When
she had finished, I said, "You know, you have given me
the beginning of my speech, and what else you have
done is that you have given me some recall, because I
now remember some things about when I entered law
school."
I had been a major in philosophy during my liberal
arts education with its highly disciplined, intellectual,
logical system. I believed that I had the rules of logic
by the tail, and I thought that I had heard that the law
was logical, and that the law was a system. By the end
of my first year in law school I said, "This is not for me."
I hated it.
.
But I might be peculiar and it might be that my
daughter inherited some peculiar genes from me, so
I spoke to my law secretary. His recall, at first, was not
very good either, and his answers were not very useful.
Then I told him what my daughter had said. He's been
out of law school about five or six years, therefore, it's
eight or nine years since he was an entering student.
And I said, "What was your condition when you en­
tered?" He said, "By golly, it was like that." He said,
"At the beginning I was at the top of the heap. I had
done exceedingly well at my college, Cornell; I had been
admitted to Columbia Law School; everything was open
for me; it was marvelous; it was wonderful." He said,
"After a few months the truth began to come through
and I was distraught. It took me a long time to straight­
en out. I was on the Law Review before I finished, but
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I had a terrible time before I was through." I figured
that I would carry my research just a little bit further.
My family is studded with lawyers, I want you to
know, although this isn't a family story, I promise you.
I spoke to my son-in-law, who is a lawyer. He's been out
of law school about four or five years, and I did not tell
him about these other and earlier conversations. I said,
"Bill, if you were in your first year at law school and I
was there to speak to you, and have in mind who I am
and what I've done or haven't done, what would you
want to hear from me?" He said, "I'd want to hear" ...
now notice the parallel here, he came through with
some other constructive suggestions, but notice the par­
allel ... he said, "I'd want to be told that all the things
I learned and achieved in liberal arts education were not
necessarily relevant in the learning of the law. I'd want
to be told that the law is different; that it's a different
kind of discipline. I'm not quite sure why it's different,
but it is, and that every single one of us, when we entered
law school, first came a cropper, in the first few months,
and some never came out of it until the end of the first
year, and some even later. I would have wanted to be
warned of that so that I would be prepared for it, because
at the beginning it was easy, and at the beginning I was in
the flush of self-esteem and self-confidence."
Last night I stopped off in Ann Arbor and I spoke to
a young lady, a first year law student, and I wasn't a
good lawyer, because I didn't first check something
that I'll mention to you in a moment. I said to her, "If
I were addressing your class as an entering class, what
would you like me to say?" "Oh," she said, "I don't
know, I'm all confused." And I thought, my gosh, my
research hasn't been complete. This case is different.
And then I caught myself; (it shows you how careful
you have to be in research) classes had started at Mich­
igan six weeks before. Then I asked her, "By the way,
how was it at the beginning?" "Oh," she said, "at the
beginning it was wonderful. I'd been told how terrible
law school was, how difficult, and it wasn't at all." But
she said, "It didn't stay that way." So, the exception was
no longer an exception.
Now to move just a little bit closer to what I want to
tell you; there is something strange about the law. You
know, almost every man thinks he is equipped to discuss
the law with you, that he is equipped to decide whether
a rule of law is good or a rule of law is bad. Unlike his
treatment of professionals in other fields, as medicine
or in the exact sciences, whether mathematics or nu­
clear physics, he assumes that this is within his ken.
In the law he believes that he is entitled to have the
same kind of judgment as those who have spent their
lifetimes learning its peculiar vocabularies, its mislead­
ing ambiguities, the peculiar concepts, the mislead­
ing concepts, properly called fictions, with respect to
the law, and so, if you as liberal arts graduates come
to law school and feel that you have a right to
think that you can understand it quite easily, you're
not out of the ordinary at all. You're right in the
proper lay tradition, and just to confuse you a little
bit about that, we lawyers often say, and it's con­
sidered even a principle in jurisprudence, that law is
based on common sense and that if the law is not intel­
ligible to the layman it is not good law.
All of these things, you see, obviously cannot be true
at the same time. There is something that requires a
synthesis here. So let's try to see if I can analyze what
the trouble is. I want to say, with no false effort at
modesty or humility, for which I'm not noted, that I am
not sure that my answers are right, but I do assure you
that I believe that these are the answers and that they
may provide data of some value to you.
First, we have the obvious premise that the law is a
discipline like other disciplines, with its own vocabu­
lary, its own techniques, its own categories, which is a
matter more involved than that of vocabulary, and those
of you who have studied logic or philosophy will know
exactly what I mean, and also with its own traditions.
Traditions suggest that the historical import will affect
a discipline, and obviously, when we're dealing with a
social field-a humanity-history and tradition will be
much more important than it is in the other so-called
exact sciences. Although you do not have to know much
about science to know that even there history influences
our understanding and our so-called knowledge of what
those sciences have to offer or discover for us. But when
you deal with a social field, it is much more true that
history will influence its content and method.
The second, and not such an obvious fact, is, and you're
going to be surprised that I claim it is not such an ob­
vious fact, that the law is not a branch of a logical science,
nor is it born of a logical methodology. The law is a
social science and at the same time it is not merely a
science, it is also an art and skill in the sense that it
involves the doing of things. That does not give you
the full import of what I want to say; my statement
may be too obvious. After all, I did not have to come
all the way to Chicago to tell you that the law is con­
cerned with practical applications, but my point is that
the law, unlike every other discipline, covers absolutely
every aspect of human activity and inactivity in an or­
ganized society, so there is nothing that it does not
touch-absolutely nothing that it does not touch. When
one considers the other important orders in our society,
whether of religion, or morals, if you distinguish between
the two, or of politics, the sciences, the economic order,
and, indeed, all of the institutions of society, from the
family to the largest aggregates of social organization,
there is just nothing that the law does not touch. Even
when the law abstains from laying its hand on the con­
duct of human beings, it, in a sense, is functioning by
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withholding its regulation. Now that, you see, is going
to make the law a very complicated discipline.
You can begin to understand, too, from what has been
said, that the law is very different from all the other
things, even the most "social" of the social sciences that
you studied in the liberal arts schools. Nothing was quite
so embracive, nothing was quite so universal, but the
end is not yet.
There is another quality that is peculiar to law. Some
of the qualities I have already mentioned are shared to
some limited extent with other social disciplines, but
there is one that is peculiar to law, and that is ... and
although this is not an easy thing to understand, it is
a very easy thing to phrase ... that the law makes its own
conditions. You see, in economics, for example, to take
a real social science, a rule in economics maybe valid or
invalid, true or false. If it is false, it simply means we
did not know enough. In law, that does not quite follow.
The law, by making its rules the rules, makes them the
law. It creates its own conditions. If the law says that
using narcotics is a crime, by gosh, it's a crime. Now in
economics, you know, if somebody adopts a rule .
you'll notice that lawyer phrasing, "adopts a rule" .
rather, finds a rule that such and such a factor will affect
the demand under such and such circumstances, it is
either true or false. The economists do not change the
conditions by their pronouncements of rules, but the
law does. For example, if the law says that a horse is a
cow, the horse nevertheless remains a horse, but there
is still a strange thing. The courts will treat the horse as
if it were a cow, and when that happens, law students
and almost all lawyers get apoplexy.
As a consequence of these few points that I have
made for you, and take what follows not as an apology
for law, but as a claim of pride on behalf of the law in
its travail, that because these things are true, the law
falters and stumbles. It moves ahead and then it slips
backward. Sometimes it goes too fast, sometimes it moves
too slowly. Sometimes it adjusts and sometimes it adapts
and sometimes, too, it misadjusts and misadapts. Some­
times it follows what is happening in society and some­
times it even leads.
If we assume that the purpose of law is the fulfillment
of society's ends, sometimes it is a failure and sometimes
it is a success. But this is no reason for having less love
and respect for it. This is what I did not know in my
first year in law school. This stems from the fact that
because the law is as universal as I told you, and be­
cause it covers all of society's problems, it must, by de­
finition, suffer from every human failing, from every
failing in society. If man does not know enough, then
the law does not know enough. If man is greedy, the
law will reflect that greediness. If man is beastly, the
law will reflect beastliness, and I could carry the parallels
indefinitely, but you can do that for yourself. Because
the law, you see, is a reflection of the entire, both in ex­
tent and in depth, panorama of organized society.
To expect the law to be any better than the organized
society in which it exists, is to expect the impossible. It is
a very evil thing and a failure where it does not even
rise to the level of its society. Then there is rejection of
law and even revolution, as there should be. But to
expect it to be much better, this is expecting what can­
not be. So to find exactitude where there is no exacti­
tude in society is impossible. To find perfect knowledge
where there is no perfect knowledge in society is im­
possible. This may help explain to you when the days
of confusion begin to come to you, how and why law
has stumbled, how it has faltered, how it has moved
ahead, how it has fallen back, how it tries to adjust,
always in the hands of ordinary human beings who are,
of course, finite.
Even as I speak to you tonight of this, I am not sure
that this is the answer to explain the confusion. Many
have tried to find the answers to problems of this kind
and no man claims that he has them with any certainty,
so that I am not picking myself out as the only modest
man in the group.
Now there still can be a little further help that we
can get out of this broad philosophical area and try to
deal with the question of what it is that you are supposed
to be learning in law school. In the first place, we have
cases, and this method of teaching law by cases has its
own devilment in it. Before Langdell developed the case
method at Harvard Law School, law was studied out
of texts, great texts written by great minds, texts that
were also used by the courts in the way of citation of
learned but not binding authority, something as they
still do to a certain extent in continental countries under
the so-called civil codes. Texts have a beauty to them.
They have system. You start out with definitions; they
give you principles; they give you rules. In short, they
give you answers. It is not just an endless questionnaire.
Yet we do not use texts in this way, with some very
few exceptions. We have not used texts in the better
law schools now for half a century, and more. We use
cases, and I will try to tell you why.
The law operates by generalizations, by rules, but we
have become skeptical about rules and generalizations.
We have learned that it is easy to confuse a collection
of words with a true generalization which describes an
existing condition. But in cases we see how the rules
and generalizations are actually applied. This is why we
stress cases. Just to begin to introduce some of that con­
fusion that perhaps you have not reached in only your
'Second day: it is not true that the law is cases. The law
is still rules and generalizations, and if you reach that
distorted state of mind where you think there are only
cases, you end up without any law. You just end up
with decisions and judgments by individuals in cases,
that if the friend will lend him his gun he will go ahunt­
ing with the gun and return it to him the next day. He
hasn't the slightest intention of going hunting, he hasn't
the slightest intention of returning the gun. Obviously,
that's not fraud, but the facts literally, but only literally,
fit the definition. No court would be so asinine as to ap­
ply that generalization to it. I have given you a very
simple, very glaring, obvious example. You don't have to
be a lawyer to see the trouble with that one. But this is
the kind of stuff out of which the exceptions to the rules
begin to come. Then we have exceptions to the excep­
tions, because again, you see, we are not interested in con­
structing an ideal system of words; we are not writing a
beautiful text; we are deciding real cases with real peo­
ple; and we use generalizations in order to understand
what rules we are supposed to apply and to discipline
those who try the cases so that they will try them, not
according to their own visceral or subjective reaction at
the particular time, but in accordance with rules that
have been laid down and learned by statute or precedent,
as the case may be.
Let me give you another illustration, and this, again,
is an ultra-simple one, but it can suggest the same kind
of problems that you would have with the first. This is
an illustration that appears in a case and materials book
used at one of the Eastern law schools. There is a wait­
ing-room in a station. The sign on the waiting-room
says, "No Dogs Allowed." A man comes along with a
trained bear on a chain. May he enter the waiting­
room with his bear? The words were so simple-No
Dogs Allowed. But were they so simple? And what is
the problem of the law with respect to enforcing the
possible responsibilities and liabilities that would stem
from such a sign? And it is no different from my fraud
illustration, really it is not. Analytically it is not, and
troubles with signs like that do occur, except that you
don't see many trained bears around, but there will be
people wih cats, there will be people with parakeets in
a box, there will be people with parrots and, by the way,
the problem may arise in connection with a tariff sched­
ule for shipment on a train or ship or plane and so on,
endlessly, always these problems with words; and be­
cause we are dealing with the rules by which society is
governed, these troubles are our business.
Now, both in the several principles I tried to give you
before about what law was, as separated from other dis­
ciplines, and from the problems I gave you in connection
with the handling of cases as opposed to the fact that
law consists of rules and generalizations, you have some­
thing else super-imposed that introduces the real chaos,
because chaos was the right word, and it is not found
just in the contraries I put to you. It is found in some­
thing else, and this is straight jurisprudence.
There are three imperatives for any rule of law that
distinguishes it from any other kind of rule that might
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and that is not law. There is something much more that
impels both the lawyer and the judge to decide a case
the way they do, and it is the need to apply principles of
generalization. We work with the cases and yet out of
the cases; instead of using the text as a crutch, you must
find the rules and generalizations upon which the casJe
rests; and to make the matter still more confusing, you
cannot quite trust the judge who wrote the opinion
when he gives you his generalizations. In the first place,
he may not have been a good craftsman, although he may
be a fairly good judge and reach the right result. So
the reasons he gives may not be so good. Or he may be
one of these crafty fellows-to use a word with the
same etymon but with an entirely different meaning­
he may be one of these crafty fellows who deliberately
gives you a false reason for reaching a result for which
he is afraid to give you the real reason.
But you see, you want to know how the next case is
going to be decided, so you've got to find out what the
real rule is, what is the real generalization, that, in fact,
moved the court to do as it did, consciously or uncon­
sciously. Thus, you are going to find professors of yours,
who are not natural-born sadists deliberately irritating
you, who insist on asking what is the holding of the case,
what the court said, what it had to say or reason in order
to reach that holding, as distinguished from the dictum
that it uttered, and whether, in fact, it really meant what
it said. This does not mean that all lawyers, judges in­
cluded, are completely untrustworthy speakers of the
word. Think back of what I told you before. This is
rough stuff. This is dealing with the facts of life. This is
deciding cases about people who are involved in disputes.
The law deals with what are all trouble matters, and
the need for reaching a just result is a very difficult one
indeed, and judges are not selected in such numbers or in
such ways as will produce uniformly a collection of the
wisest men in the realm. And by the way, if you chose
them that way, you probably would not have a good
judiciary. There is a lot more to the problem of govern­
ment of the people, of which the judiciary is a branch,
than merely having intellectual and logical excellence,
and perhaps scholarship to boot.
I would like to give you a bit of an illustration where
some of these knotty problems get us into trouble. If we
work with texts, we have a simple definition of fraud,
for example. Fraud would be the misrepresentation of a
fact to another with the intent that he should rely on it
for the purpose of obtaining something of value from
him. In courts they will sometimes refer to it as the five
fingers of fraud; false statement of fact, the knowledge of
its falsity by the utterer of it, the intention that the other
should rely on it, the actual reliance by the victim, and
the deprivation of the victim of his property or other
thing of value by the actor, the evil actor. All right. So
the friend lies to his friend who wishes to commit suicide,
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govern you and that might be imposed upon you by
the state or other political authority. The first is neutral­
ity of the rule. The second is justice and the third is
equality. Now these three things are not the same, and
the odd thing is they do not live together very well.
That is where the chaos comes in; but first let's try to
define them, remembering that definition in this field
of ours is a very slippery eel.
Neutrality requires that the arbiter of cases, the maker
of law, be ideally absolutely impartial with regard to
the consequences to whom the rule is applied. He just
doesn't care-he just doesn't. He'll treat his own mother
the same way he would treat the stranger. He's totally
neutral. The rule is supposed to be neutral. If the rule
is you must pay your debt, everybody must pay his debt;
the neutral doesn't distinguish. The second thing is that
the rule is supposed to achieve a just result. Now with­
out getting into all of the subtleties of what a just
result is-that you will have trouble with even in your
third year, let alone now-let's assume that the just re­
sult is what we expect the law to achieve in deciding
cases so that when you get the result, you say this is
the way it ought to be-this is the right decision. The
umpire has done the right thing-he called that ball as
it was. That's oversimplification, but for our purposes,
take it as that. The third thing is there must be equality
of treatment. That is a little different from neutrality.
The neutrality relates to the motivation with which you
start. Now you've done it-you were very neutral and
you did it. Now the same case comes up again, but now
either because you know more, have learned more, or
have changed your mind, or whatever it may be, you
would like to decide this case differently. Then you
violate the principle of equality. You don't have a stable
rule anymore. And the reason we need these two things,
the equality and the neutrality, because justice, you see,
is the big diamond in the tiara, that's the main one, the
reason you need the other two is because dealing with
finite people we assume that if they will be both neutral
in their treatment of everyone, and equal in their treat­
ment of cases, the chances of just results being achieved
is very, very high, recognizing that a man doesn't just
look at a situation and say, "Ah, this is the just answer."
It isn't that easy. Think of the No Dog Allowed sign
again. So we need these other two for that purpose. But
you see, they don't sit well together because every time
you get a new case it's just a little bit different because
all human events are slightly different, even just be­
cause the events happened a little later, and as you get
to know more about things, and the changing external
conditions, your attitudes may change, and so will your
sense of rightness. So there is a strong tendency to have
what's called a free judgment. Just decide every case
the way it comes along. But you see, most of us believe->
there is dispute about it-most of us believe that that is
not a true system of law. So this means we have to
reconcile ourselves to some unjust results in order to
obtain neutrality and equality, but our tolerance is not
unlimited. When we find the number of unjust cases
precipitated by these other imperatives of neutrality and
equality, we rebel and we create an exception, or we
create a fiction of law, or we just stand on our heads and
say, "I hope nobody sees us doing this." And this, as
we make an exception without saying so, makes for
confusion and chaos in the rules and the cases and in the
work you do, because human beings working in the
mines have decided these matters, and they have been
affected by the danger of an unjust result. They have
struggled with the rule or the generalization and did
not like it, as applied in that case, and they did not
quite know how to get out of the quandary.
It is often said that a very skillful craftsman can avoid
these unjust situations without doing violence to the
rules, but that most people are not very skilled crafts­
men. This applies to the practice of the law as well as to
the business of judging. You know, if you're a very smart
lawyer you'll be surprised at what you can do for your
client without cutting any corners, but when you're not
very smart, and you try to do the same thing for your
client by cutting a corner you might be disbarred, and
the client could even go to jail.
I do not want you to get any idea that law is a highly
relativistic business and anything that happens goes. If
you actually look to the incidence of cases you will find
that tested by almost any standard that you would use,
if you only agree on the standard, you will approve of
the results, whatever the reasons that may have been
given. But there is a generalization, a proper generaliza�
tion, lurking somewhere that would explain why you
like all of these results, even though they are justified
verbally by conflicting or contrary supporting explana­
tions. It is much like explaining jury verdicts. If you
talk to trial lawyer after trial lawyer they will tell you,
and judges, too, that the juries are very stupid. You ask
jurors after they have rendered a verdict how they de­
cided the case, you may get the sheerest nonsense in the
world, the worst fallacies, the worst recollections of the
evidence, complete misunderstanding of the judge's
charge, introduction of utterly irrelevant and prejudicial
factors in deciding the case, but if you ask the lawyer,
"Did they decide it the right way?" he is likely to answer,
"Yes, they did." The laymen on the jury are the least
trained in analysis and yet we know as a fact, and most
of us agree, that they do reach the right results. This may
go back to that paradox I mentioned to you earlier, that
law is based on common sense, and if it is not intelligi­
ble to the layman, it is not good law. That is why a
jury can actually function in a court system without
doing violence to the system of the law, and you will see
that most arguments about eliminating the jury are
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based upon the argument that the judges would decide
the cases the same way anyway, which simply means the
juries haven't been deciding it so badly if that argu­
ment is valid.
But let me move on a bit. The three factors that I have
mentioned give rise to these conflicts and this chaos. The
chaos and the lack of system and the troubles are all the
worse because the discords will vary in degree, and here
you will begin to see where your roles as lawyers come
into it, if there are failures of advocacy. If the lawyers do
not go a good job, the chances of these failures occurring
are all the greater; there is greater difficulty in achieving
the just result consistent with the principles of neutrality
and equality of treatment. You will find that there may
be failures of proof-that are nobody's fault, that are in­
evitable. In other words, you have two cases that seem
to be alike, but in one case they prove the X factor and
in the other case they do not prove the X factor. By way
of hunch you believe that the X factor was present in
both cases, but it is not proven. What do you do? And
then, of course, we have the weakness of our own gen­
eralizations and definitions, like the definition of fraud.
Time-honored and ancient as it is, it does not describe,
in the strict definitional sense what is fraud. You will
recall that for a definition to be perfect there must be
classification by family and differentiation, including
everything that is to be covered and excluding everything
that is not to be covered. I venture to say that you will
never find a definition of law that does that, because we
are not defining words for a dictionary; we are defining
working propositions that are to be applied to cases in
real society and that makes the difference. Real society
just does not fit into neat little-you cannot include
the bear in the definition of a dog, and it is a tamed,
chained bear, at that. If an unleashed bear is involved
you have no trouble with the case; it's easy. Why is it
easy? There is another principle lurking there some­
where. But this is a trained bear and it is on a chain. Why
would you have less trouble with a parakeet in a little
box as compared with an Ameircan bald eagle in a
wicker basket? The sign only said No Dogs Allowed.
Then, of course, obviously, a changing society engenders
an evolution of new insights. Hence, we often find our­
selves rebelling against principles that we used before
and considered established. This trouble arises with statu­
tory law just as much as with decisional law. Not many
decades ago there were many crimes for which people
could receive capital punishment, certainly an extreme
sanction. Today there are very few crimes that people
think merit the sanction and many people would abolish
it for all. I take this kind of illustration deliberately be­
cause implicit in the sanction is a generalization that it
serves certain social purposes. Why did they kill people
for committing larceny in England in 181O? They did it
because they believed it would serve certain essential
social purposes. Obviously, they have decided that it never
did, or, at least, that it does not at present. Now one takes
a simple thing like that, and it if gives you trouble, think
of the troubles that are given us by these marked ad­
vances in the techniques of economic enterprise, the
development of administrative law, and the development
of government regulation and involvement with eco­
nomic enterprise today.
Moreover, one may not neglect the great public issues
involving civil rights and the status of minorities, and
anybody who thinks that the transition legally from
Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. the Board of Education
can be accomplished by any kind of logical process
merely, just does not understand anything at all about
the law. This is disturbing in the first year, because you
are looking for some kind of certain technique, some
kind of neat logic that one can use and it is not there.
This is a different kind of discipline.
Now when one reaches technical and procedural prob­
lems the confusion is even greater and the principles
even harder to extract. When one starts dealing with the
problem of hearsay evidence, for example, one is likely
to get quite a few fixed notions, like so many Anglo­
American lawyers have done before, after being exposed
to the hearsay rule, that the doctrine was divinely or­
dained. In fact, it is hard to believe that history and tradi­
tion are the real explanations. On the continent of
Europe, hearsay evidence is used almost without limi­
tation. Professor Morgan wrote a model code of evidence
for the American Law Institute which contains very
serious and sharp inroads into the so-called hearsay evi­
dence rule. The hearsay evidence rule itself is shot
through with exceptions and exceptions on the excep­
tions. The fact of the matter is all hearsay is not un­
reliable. If a hundred witnesses who ran from the scene
because they did not want to be involved eventually told
ten honest policemen what happened, that's pretty good
evidence if it is probability of truth you are after, but
we won't admit a single bit of it.
The reason all those exceptions to the hearsay rule
developed are the problems I discussed with you before.
Courts faced with real situations, real problems, recognize
that even though, under the literal generalizations of the
hearsay rule, evidence is not admissible, there may be very
reliable proof and it ought to be admissible; as, for ex­
ample, when we are talking about the so-called dying
declaration of a victim of a murder, which, in some ways,
is the most extreme kind of hearsay. Because the man
has just been shot, the policeman has arrived at the scene,
the victim is gasping, he knows he's about to die, and
he says, "Johnny Brown did it," then the policeman can
testify to what was said. It was not said under oath, it
was not said in court, but you see, they feel he's about to
face his Maker, or worse, and so he'll tell the truth.
Then, for another illustration, there's an old one that
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drove me wild when I was in my first year of law school.
I had a very distinguished professor of criminal law, his
name is renowned in the field, and I was an old phi­
losophy student, have that in mind, and he was explain­
ing how the criminal law no longer is based on ven­
geance; once it was, but it is no longer. Now the purpose
was to deter wrongful acts and every crime must have
a wrongful intent, a mens rea, and also a wrongful act,
and both must concur, if there is to be a crime. He gave
The Bigelow Teaching Fellows for 1965-66, left to right: James T.
Caleshu; Professor David P. Currie, who is in charge of the
Tutorial Program; A. G. S. Pollock; John M. Evans; and Thomas
D. Morgan, JD'65. Not shown is Raymond M. Ellinwood, Jr.,
JD'65.
The Hinton Moot Court Committee for 1965-66, left to right:
Richard E. Poole, Wilmington, Del.; James E. Betke, Chicago,
Chairman; Donald J. Christl, Chicago; Frank H. Wohl, Ogden,
Utah; Robert A. Skirnick, Chicago; James F. Kelley, Milwaukee;
and Russell Bantham, Chicago. Not shown is Howard B. Abrams,
Chicago.
as an illustration what I suppose has been given a thou­
sand times in hundreds of law schools. My teacher said
that there is a student's watch on his desk. The student
who owns it, but does not recognize it as his watch,
thinks it is the teacher's. The student stealthily removes
it. Is there a crime? And students raised their hands and
said, "Of course not, there was no wrongful act, it was
the man's own watch." So, stupid me, I raised my hand
too and I said, "I don't follow that. If the purpose was
merely deterrence, I can see why you need an objective
manifestation. We should not attempt to read a man's
mind, that's unreliable. But here it is perfectly obvious
that the man was out to steal, and you want to catch
thieves and stop them from doing it again. Weare not
trying to revenge him for taking sornebodv's watch, we
are trying to prevent stealing. Why shouldn't he be
punished?" The answer to me was, "You think you're
smart, don't you?" I did. It was my first year.
I think that I have given you enough to spell out some
of the seeming confusions. I do not have to take you by
the hand and show you further. It should be clear, al­
most clear, why we go to the cases, and yet why the
law is not cases, and why the techniques of the law and
the lawyer are going to be so different from those in
economics, to take a difficult field, or sociology, to take
another difficult field, or even from nuclear physics,
which is a field we think of as capable of exactness, if
only we know enough. In this sense the natural sciences
are easy because one is dealing with something that pur­
ports to be an exact science, the rules of which can be
tested in various ways with reasonably controlled experi­
ments. We cannot control most of our experiments.
There is still another difficulty. Everytime we do some­
thing we create our own conditions as I told you before.
At the same time we have to work with angels and we
have to work with devils. We have to make laws and
rules for good men and we have to make laws and rules
for bad men, and it isn't that we're even engaged in a
trial and error method. Serious things have to go on
ahead while we fuddle around, and as we fuddle we
may be creating the conditions that never should have
come to pass. We may be aggravating evil conditions.
Let me again give a simple illustration from the field
of criminal law. I refer to a current problem, and it is
also a legal problem. Should the sale of narcotics be
made a crime? Should the obtaining of narcotics be
prevented by making the sale to the narcotics addict a
crime or are we sowing dragons' teeth so that we
produce more crime, both of the narcotics variety itself
and associated crime committed to raise the money to
buy the narcotics at the high prices dictated by the il­
legality of the market by reason of that kind of rule?
Some of you must be quite familiar with the discussion
and the debate at that level. It is a matter of the highest
controversy at the present time. You know the problem
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is no different when you try to decide what should be
the liabilities of a seller of merchandise who ships the
merchandise across the land under a bill of lading and
the bank at the other end has some responsibilities with
regard to picking up the cash for the bill of lading against
a sight draft. Surely it's not as important as narcotics
addiction, or is it not as important? After all, the pro-'
ductive side of our society is what makes the rest of it
possible, and one cannot pick any essential part of this
society of ours and say we can dispense with it, or that
it is not important legally, because it does not affect us
emotionally as much as something else. Then, too, we
are governed by certain other corollary principles. Dis­
putes we must decide, otherwise people will decide
them by force, and one of the chilling things you will
learn is that it is more important that we decide the dis­
pute than that we decide it correctly. So, for example,
a legal system that would take three years to decide a case
correctl y maybe worse than a legal system that does not
do too badly, but does not decide them correctly, but
but at least decides them within a matter of weeks. I
saw an interesting discussion just the other day in the
New York Law Journal, saying that the Supreme Court
rule in Sullivan v. The New York Times, making a
showing of actual malice a condition before there may
be recovery for defamation against public officials by
depriving injured persons of a libel remedy may bring
us back to the days when the libeled person would
resort to self help. In other words, when you withhold
a legal sanction you have to think twice as to the conse­
quences. If one says that something will not be covered
by legal regulation you may be suggesting to these
people that since nothing is going to be done by the
state you will have to take care of this matter yourself,
and they will. For example, in criminal law one of the
things we believe is that in imposing sentence we must
pay some attention to the anger and demand for retri­
bution of the community, not too much, just enough to
quiet them so they won't go out and lynch. But you
can't just ignore community reaction. Take, particularly,
the kinds of crime that arouse great emotional reaction;
for example, rapes, vicious assaults against old people,
against children. So it is true, obviously, that the man
who did it was a very sick man or he never had any
advantages, or he was very underprivileged. Will the
community permit that man to escape any retribution?
If you think so, then we can handle the case on a
purely individual and sociological basis. But if it is law
and order we have to maintain, we have to look to
something else. I said before the law created its own
conditions. It does as law, but it does not, except rarely
and in very slight degrees, change society. Remember,
the horse remained a horse, it did not become a cow.
If, for example, we pass a law that you should not have
evil thoughts, that will be the law, but it won't be very
meaningful law, and you won't be able to prosecute
anybody for it because you won't be able to prove it.
Now if you have been analytical enough, and I think
you probably have been, YOll will realize that I've been
pulling, not deceitfully, something like the philosopher's
jokes, "all generalizations are false except this one," or
"all men are liars except me"; because here, although I
have been questioning the rational and logical pattern
of the law, I have also been urging the need to find uni­
fying principles. I have also warned that one will not nec­
essarily find the principles easily in the cases and we know
that the texts will also be fallible. Here we are touching
upon the primary technique of the lawyer and why it is so
difficult to be a good lawyer. From one point of view
one must work with the worst materials possible, and
yet by strokes of genius one must elicit rules and gener­
alizations on the basis of which one can advise the
client, argue to a court, or, if one is a judge, decide the
case.
Yet, this a grand system; it is just a most difficult one.
It is not a chaos, it does have order, but it is an order
imposed upon a society, the order of which itself is not
all neat and buttoned up. I suppose we could devise a
perfect legal system for a society uncovered by a group
of excavating archaeologists because then we could
study it at our leisure, we could make rules and the
conditions that wouldn't change and we would give
them a perfect legal system, and it would be a lovely
museum piece to put alongside the skeletons and the
artifacts and the fabrics of clothing that they wore and
all the rest of it along with the chards. But you cannot
do that with a living society.
Now I said I would not make this a family story, but
I've got to bring in another lawyer member of my fam­
ily. My wife is also a lawyer but she doesn't practice law,
hasn't practiced it since my first daughter was born,
and I told her about my research into the subject matter
for my talk tonight, and she said (a very cynical person
she is, too, with no respect for her husband, based upon
long experience; indeed, I have been married to her
even longer than I have been a lawyer) and she said,
"It is all useless. They will not remember in December
what you said in October." Now that does not daunt
me, because I do not expect you to remember everything.
You will not remember everything you study in law
school, either, and if human knowledge and skills de­
pended on remembering all the things we learn we
may as well give up and go back to the wigwams. The
fact of the matter is there is something else we acquire
in the process of learning, and maybe there are some
drops of my mental perspiration that will descend on
you and add some clarity to something. We will know
if there has been a benefit out of it, if at the end of
three years, and I challenge you to it, you will be able
to tell me what should have been said to a first year class.
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Professor Jo Desha Lucas holding forth at an alumni gathering in
Salt Lake City.
Professor Lucas, now shown in Denver, has not lost his audience
The speaker's table at the Annual Meeting of the Law Alumni
Association of New York, left to right: George B. Pidot, JD'30;
Waleed M. Sadi, JD'58, Jordanian Delegate to the United Nations;
Donald L. Janis, '61, retiring president of the Association; Sheldon
Tefft, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, the principal speaker;
Frank H. Detweiler, JD'31, incoming president of the Association,
and Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe, JD'50.
F. Max Schuette, JD'50, Kenneth S. Tollett, JD'55, Assistant Dean
James M. Ratcliffe, JD'50, James P. Markham, JD'22, and John H.
Freeman, '12, at the Houston alumni luncheon at which Dean
Ratcliffe was the speaker.
Summer V\fork for NCLC
The National Council of Legal Clinics has continued
into a second year its program encouraging the place­
ment of law students for summer work in areas of the
Council's interest. In the summer just passed, fifteen
University of Chicago Law School students worked in
such positions, the variety of which may be of interest:
JAMES L. BAILLIE, Office of the Public Defender, Miami,
Florida.
GEOFFREY A. BRAUN, Legal Aid Society of Nassau County,
New York.-
RICHARD H. CHUSED, Neighborhood Legal Advice Clinic
Program, Chicago.
DANIEL H. FRIEDMAN, Legal Service Unit of Mobilization
for Youth, New York.
ANDREW R. GILLIN, Probation and Parole Service of the
Danish Welfare Society, Copenhagen.
JEFFREY H. HAAS, Neighborhood Legal Services Project,
Washington, D.C.
CHRISTOPHER JACOBS, Community Renewal Foundation,
Chicago.
MICHAEL KAUFMAN, Office of Fifth Ward Alderman, Chi­
cago.
WAYNE A. KERSTETTER, National Labor Relations Board,
Chicago.
ELINOR B. LEVINSON, Legal Aid Office, Portland, Maine.
WILLIAM A. LONDON, Legal Aid Bureau of Chicago.
ROBERTA C. RAMO, American Civil Liberties Union, Chi.
cago.
BARRY ROBERTS, Neighborhood Legal Services Project,
Washington, D.C.
JOEL S. SEIDENSTEIN, Civil Liberties Union, New York.
ALLEN H. SHAPIRO, Illinois Crime Commission, Chicago.
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Forty-One and Fifty-Six
The Twenty-Fifth Reunion of the Class of 1941 was
held at the Law School in June. Arranged by J. GORDON
HENRY and Professor WALTER J. BLUM, the dinner re­
union drew an attendance of forty, including classmates,
from New York, Indianapolis, and St. Louis. The dinner
program featured Professor Blum as toastmaster, and
James Parker Hall Professor of Law SHELDON TEFFT,
and DEAN PHIL C. NEAL as speakers. The evening con­
cluded with the sort of tour of the Law Buildings which
can be led only by Chairman of the Faculty Building
Committee Walter Blum.
The Tenth Reunion of the Class of 1956 began with
tours of the Law Buildings. It centered on a dinner,
held in the Center for Continuing Education. A detailed,
engrossing, and probably slanderous report on the mem­
bers of the class, by BRUCE KAUFMAN, followed brief
remarks by Dean Neal.
The Committee for the reunion was LANGDON ANN
COLLINS, ROBERT L. AUSTIN, and DONALD M. SCHINDEL.
Planning is already beginning for reunions in the
Spring of 1967. Suggestions and advice from members of
the Classes of 1962, 1957, 1942, and indeed, any other
class in the mood for a reunion, will be welcomed by
the School.
The Board of Editors of The University of Chicago Law Review
for 1965-66, left to right, back row: Roland E. Brandel, Chicago;
Walter Robinson III, Yakima, Wash.; Robert M. Berger, Chicago,
Managing Editor; Alexander B. Aikman, Verona, N.J., Managing
Editor; Neil M. Levy, Brooklyn, N.Y.; David S. Tatel, Silver
Spring, Md.; and Henry C. Krasnow, Chicago. Left to right,
front row: Michael L. Shakman, Wilmette, Ill., Managing Editor;
David N. Brown, Pitman, N.J., Managing Editor; George A.
Ranney, Jr., Chicago, Editor-in-Chief; Duane W. Krohnke, Perry,
Iowa, Managing Editor; David C. Landgraf, Riverton, N.J.; and
Stephen L. Babcock, Freeport, Ill.
The officers of Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity, 1965-66, left to
right, standing: Roland E. Brandel, Chicago; and Melvin B. Gold­
berg, Chicago. Seated: Bruce H. Schoumacher, Chicago; and
J. William Mayer, Summit, N.J., President.
The Staff of The Law School Reporter (all Class of 1968), left to
right, back row: Allen H. Shapiro, Chicago, Editor; and John H.
YQung, Chicago. Left to right, middle row: Celeste M. Stachnik,
Des Plaines, Ill.; Roger L. Price, Chicago; and Joel S. Seidenstein,
Bronx, N.Y. Left to right, bottom row: Ronald L. Hirsch, Mt.
Penn, Pa.; Philip W. Getts, Duluth, Minn.; Charles A. Marvin,
Evanston, Ill.; and LeRoy P. Nesbit, Glenville, Minn. Not shown,
Richard I. Badger, No. Bennington, Vt.; James P. Carey, River
Forest, Ill.; Lee M. Mitchell, Lake Forest, Ill.; and John N. Tier­
ney, Chicago.
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The Bench for the final argument in the Hinton Moot Court Competition, top to bottom: The Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28,
Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois; The Honorable Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire; and
The Honorable Henry J. Friendly, Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. All are members of the Law School Visiting
Committee.
Visiting Committee
The Annual Meeting of the Law School Visiting Corn­
mittee, a group of distinguished judges and lawyers who
provide advice and assistance to the Dean and FacuIty,
was held on April 8, 1966.
In the morning, members of the Committee attended
classes and met with law students at an informal coffee
hour. After lunch, DEAN NEAL presented a report on the
School.
The afternoon program opened with a panel discus­
sion, "The Escobedo Case-Whither or Wither?" Par­
ticipants were THE HONORABLE HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, THE
HONORABLE WALTER V. SCHAEFER, JD'28, Justice of the
Illinois Supreme Court and Chairman of the Visiting
Committee, THE HONORABLE HUBERT L. WILL, JD'37,
Judge of the U.S. District Court, Northern District of
Illinois, Professor BERNARD D. MELTZER, and Professor
PHILIP B. KURLAND, presiding. The session concluded
with a report on the findings of the Law School Jury
Project by Professor HARRY KALVEN, JR., and Professor
HANS ZEISEL.
The Committee then met in Executive Session, with
Justice Schaefer, Committee Chairman, presiding.
Following dinner, the members of the Committee were
special guests at the Final Argument of the Hinton
Moot Court Competition. The Court was composed of
THE HONORABLE FRANK R. KENISON, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Judge Friendly
and Justice Schaefer, all members of the Committee.
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At the Faculty Reception for the Visiting Committee, Sheldon
Tefft, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, chats with Willard L.
King of Chicago and Paul Carrington of Dallas.
It is seldom that a judge puts Professor Kurland in the shade, but
The Honorable Frank R. Kenison, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, almost succeeded in doing so at the
Faculty Reception for the Visiting Committee, as Committee Mem­
ber A. Leslie Hodson of Chicago looks on in amazement.
The Arts and the Law
The soaring market in paintings and other works of
art has served to underscore a variety of interesting and
important questions of law and of economics. In recog­
nition of this, in the Spring Quarter, 1966, the Law
School sponsored a Conference on the Arts and the Law.
The scope of the Conference was confined to painting,
sculpture and the allied arts, and focused on the arts in
the commercial marketplace.
The Conference opened with a paper on "The Eco­
nomics of the Art Market", by SIMON ROTTENBERG, Pro­
fessor of Economics, Duke University. The second speak­
er was EVERETT ELLIN, Public Affairs Officer of the So­
lomon R. Guggenheim Museum, a former art dealer,
and a member of the California and New York Bars,
who spoke on "Art and Opulence: The Commerce of
Culture in the Affluent Society." HAROLD HAYDON,
painter, Associate Professor of Art at The University of
Chicago, and art critic of the Chicago Sun-Times, and
ALEX L. HILBUN, Class of 1924, art collector and former
publisher of Hillman Periodicals, Inc., commented on
the papers. JAMES M. RATCLIFFE, Assistant Dean of the
Law School and Chairman of the Faculty Committee on
the Conference, presided.
The second session, chaired by GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR., Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law
School, opened with a talk on "The Artist and the Law,"
by JOSHUA BINION CAHN, of Cahn and Mathias, New
York. ALVIN S. LANE, of Wien, Lane and Klein, New
York, past chairman of the Committee on Art, Associa­
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, spoke on
"Problems of the Purchaser of Art Objects as Seen by a
Lawyer." The concluding paper of the Conference, on
"Taxation and the Arts," was presented by WILLIAM
A. MCSWAIN, of Eckhart, McSwain, Hassell and Husum,
Chicago, a Trustee of the Art Institute of Chicago.
At the dinner following the Arts Conference, speakers Joshua
Binion Cahn, left, and Alvin S. Lane, join Professor Soia Merit­
schikoff.
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Assistant Dean James M. Ratcliffe with Alex L. Hillman, Class
of 1924, who was a Commentator at the morning session of the
Conference on the Arts and the Law.
William A. McSwain, member of the Law School Visiting Com­
mittee and President of the Chicago Bar Association, discusses
"Tax Problems and the Arts," at the Conference on the Arts and
the Law.
Professor Leon M. Liddell and Mrs. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., with
Conference Speaker Simon Rottenberg, at the dinner following
the Arts Conference.
Arts Conference Speaker Everett Ellin, left, and Professor Walter
J. Blum, Chairman of the Faculty Conference Committee, either
joined, or divided by Rodin's Thinker.
Kreeger Inaugural Lecture
An earlier issue of the Record conveyed the welcome
news of the establishment by MRS. ARTHUR WOLF, of the
Julius Kreeger Professorship in Law and Criminology.
On May 23, 1966, Professor NORVAL MORRIS, first holder
of the Kreeger Chair, and Director of the Law School's
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, delivered the
Inaugural Lecture for the Julius Kreeger Professorship.
Professor Morris' topic was "Impediments to Penal
Reform." The Inaugural Lecture has been published in
the Summer, 1966, issue of The University of Chicago
Laar Review.
The Record is pleased to announce that the Board
of Trustees of the University of Chicago has desig­
nated the complex of buildings housing the Law
School as
THE LAIRD BELL QUADRANGLE
Formal dedication ceremonies were held on Octo­
ber 12, with former Chancellor Robert Maynard
Hutchins the principal speaker. A detailed report
of the ceremonies will appear in the next issue of
the Record.
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The Alumni Gather
The Annual Alumni Day Conference began, as is cus­
tomary, with attendance at classes by the alumni who
came to spend the day becoming better acquainted with
the Law School.
After lunch with students and faculty, the visiting
alumni heard a detailed report from DEAN NEAL. The
afternoon session, chaired by ASSISTANT DEAN RATCLIFFE,
focused on some of the research activities in progress at
the School. RONALD COASE, Professor of Economics at
the Law School, reported on the School's work in the
Law and Economics area. These activities included,
among others, the work of the four Law and Economics
Fellows and developments regarding The Journal of
Law and Economics, of which Professor Coase is Editor.
NORVAL MORRIS, Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and
Criminology, described some of the work planned for
the newly-established Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice" of which he is the Director. Finally, HARRY
KALVEN, JR., Professor of Law, and HANS ZEISEL, Profes­
sor of Law and Sociology, gave a preliminary report of
some of the findings of the School's Jury Project, which
can be found in detail in their newly published, monu­
mental study, The American Jury (Little, Brown and
Company, Boston $15.00).
The group then adjourned to the Ambassador East,
to join 400 others at the Annual Dinner of the Associa­
tion. The featured speaker was THE HONORABLE JOHN
BARTLOW MARTIN, former Presidential Envoy and Am­
bassador to the Dominican Republic, who spoke on
"Dominican Problems and American Power." Also
featured on the program, over which Alumni President
LAURENCE A. CARTON presided, were DEAN PHIL C. NEAL
and Professor GRANT GILMORE. Chairman of the Com­
mittee on the Annual Conference and Dinner was
JAMES J. MCCLURE, JR., JD'49.
Alumni attending the Annual Alumni Conference meet with stu­
dents at lunch time. Left to right, Edwin P. Wiley, JD'52, of Mil­
waukee and Mrs. Wiley; James J. McClure, Jr., JD'49, of Chicago;
and Elbert J. Kram, of Frankfort, Ind., Class of '66.
The new officers of The University of Chicago Law
School Alumni Association, installed at the Annual
Dinner, are:
PETER N. TODHUNTER, JD'37, President
CHARLES Vv. BOAND, JD'33, Vice-President
WILLIAM G. BURNS, JD'31, Vice-President
J. GORDON HENRY, JD'41, Vice-President
RICHARD H. LEVIN, JD'37, Vice-President
JAMES J. MCCLURE, JD'49, Secretary
ARNOLD I. SHURE, JD'29, Treasurer
James Hautzinger, JD'61, of Denver, second from right, with law
students, left to right: David S. Tatel, Washington, Class of '66;
Charles R. Bush, Chicago, Class of '67; and Lewis M. Callens,
Chicago, Class of '66.
Charles R. Brainerd, JD'58, of New York, with law students
Stephen R. Gainer, Class of '68, and Jon Emanuel, Class of '67.
Before lunch, at the Alumni Day Conference, left to right: David
L. James, JD'60, New York; Richard M. Stout, JD'44, St. Louis;
Dean Neal; Frederick Sass, Jr., JD'32, Washington, D.C.; and
Robert J. Donovan of the Class of '66.
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The Honorable John Bartlow Martin addressing the Annual Dinner of the Law School Alumni Association
Ambassador Martin with Laurence A. Carton, JD'47, retmng
President of the Alumni Association, and Professor Grant Gilmore.
William G. Burns, JD'31, General Chairman of the Thirteenth An­
nual Fund Campaign, with Mrs. Burns and C. Curtis Everett,
JD'57, examine the seating list at the Annual Dinner.
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Mrs. James Donohoe, James Donohoe, JD'62, of Dallas; David P.
Earle III, JD'62, and David Chernoff, JD'59, of Chicago.
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Ogle, JD'61, of Cleveland, talk with Dean
Neal at the reception.
At the reception preceding the Annual Dinner, left to right: Frederick Sass, Jr., JD'32, retiring President of the Washington, D.C. Alumni
Association; Frank H. Detweiler, JD'31, President of the Alumni Association of Metropolitan New York; J. Gordon Henry, JD'41, Vice­
President of the Law Alumni Association; and Maurice A. Rosenthal, JD'27.
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Three Generous Gifts
The Record takes great pleasure in noting the establish­
ment of three new funds in aid of the students of the
Law School.
The Esther laDe Mohr Memorial Loan and Scholar­
ship Fund, established in memory of Mrs. Mohr, J.D.,
1920 by Judith Mohr Joyce, Elaine Goodman Mohr, J.D.,
1954, and David L. Mohr, J.D., 1959. Preference is to be
given to women students, particularly those with a spe­
cial interest in human rights.
The Baker Scholarship Award, provided by a bequest
in the will of Winifred W. Baker in appreciation of the
assistance given her late husband, Ezra L. Baker, J.D.,
1909, when he was a student at the Law School.
The Earl K. Schiek Loan Fund, a testamentary gift
by the late Mr. Schiek, who was a member of the Class
of 1920.
Ave Atque Vale, to Coin a 'Phrase
Each June, on Convocation Day, the Faculty of the
Law School holds a luncheon for graduating seniors
and their families. The Toast to the Graduates was of­
fered this year by SHELDON TEFFT, James Parker Hall
Professor of Law; the Response on Behalf of the Grad­
uates came from JOSEPH V. KARAGANIS, President of the
Class of 1966. DEAN NEAL then announced the following
winners of honors and prizes:
The Joseph Henry Beale Prize, for the best work in the
First Year Tutorial Program, to MARTHA ALSCHULER,
Class of 1968.
The Karl Llewellyn Cup, awarded for excellence in brief
writing and oral argument in the second-year moot court
competition, to JOHN T. GAUBATZ and JOHN C. HOYLE,
Class of 1967.
The Wall Street [ournal Award, for outstanding work in
corporation law, to MICHAEL F. SULLIVAN, Class of 1967.
The Lawyers Title Award, for the best work in the field
of real property, to ROLAND E. BRANDEL, Class of 1966.
The United States Law Week Award, for the best progress
in the final year of law school, to WALTER J. ROBINSON III,
Class of 1966.
The Robert H. Jackson Prize, for the best paper in consri­
tutionallaw, to JAMES F. KELLEY, Class of 1966.
The Edwin F. Mandel Award, for the greatest contribu­
tion to the School's legal aid program, to DONALD M.
THOMPSON, Class of 1966.
The Hinton Moot Court Competition Awards, to How­
ARD B. ABRAMS and RICHARD G. SINGER, winners, and
to DONALD ]. CHRISTL and FRANK H. WOHL, runners up,
all of the Class of 1966.
The Jerome N. Frank Prize, for the best student contri­
bution to The University of Chicago Law Review, to
ROBERT M. BERGER, Class of 1966.
The members of the Order of the Coif, elected from
among those ranking in the top ten per cent of their
graduating class:
ALEXANDER D. AIKMAN
ROBERT G. BERGER
ROBERT M. BERGER
ROLAND E. BRANDEL
DAVID N. BROWN
LEWIS M. COLLENS
ROBERT J. DONOVAN
PAUL F. GLEESON
DUANE W. KROHNKE
GEORGE A. RANNEY, JR.
WALTER J. ROBINSON III
MICHAEL L. SHAKMAN
VOYLE C. WILSON
The Degree of Doctor of Law, cum laude, awarded to
students achieving an over-all academic average of 78 or
more, to:
ROBERT G. BERGER
ROBERT M. BERGER
ROLAND E. BRANDEL
LEWIS M. COLLENS
ROBERT J. DONOVAN
PAUL F. GLEESON
DUANE W. KROHNKE
WALTER J. ROBINSON III
MICHAEL L. SHAKMAN
The program concluded with the traditional remarks
by the first-ranking member of the graduating class,
this year, ROBERT M. BERGER.
Dean Neal announcing the awards of honors and prizes at the
annual luncheon for graduates and their families.
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Joseph V. Karaganis, President of the Class of 1966, responds for
the graduates.
Robert M. Berger, first-ranking graduate of the Class of 1966, who
spoke at the graduates' luncheon, with Mrs. Berger.
Sheldon Tefft, James Parker Hall Professor of Law, on behalf of the Faculty offers the toast to the graduates
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The Ernst Freund Lecture
The Lectureship was established ten years ago in honor
of PROFESSOR FREUND, who served as one of the most
distinguished members of the Law Faculty from the
founding of the School, in 1902-03, until his death
in 1930. Holders of the Lectureship have been THE
HONORABLE FELIX FRANKFURTER, Associate Justice, Su­
preme Court of the United States; THE HONORABLE
WALTER V. SCHAEFFER, Associate Justice, Supreme Court
of Illinois; THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. WYZANSKI,
JR., Judge of the United States District Court for Mass­
achusetts; THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD DENNING OF
WHITCHURCH, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary; THE RIGHT
HONORABLE LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON, Lord Chief
Justice of England; WILBUR G. KATZ, Professor of Law,
University of Wisconsin; THE HONORABLE JOHN MAR­
SHALL HARLAN, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States; THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR KENNETH DIP­
LOCK, Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal; and THE RIGHT
HONORABLE LORD DEVLIN, formerly Lord of Appeal in
Ordinary.
In April, 1966, the Tenth Ernst Freund Lecture was
delivered by THE HONORABLE CARL MCGOWAN, Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Judge McGowan's topic was "Problems of
an Emerging Constitution."
At the reception preceding the Freund Lecture, Mrs. Norval Mor­
ris and The Honorable F. Ryan Duffy, Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
The Honorable Carl McGowan, Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, delivering the Tenth
Ernst Freund Lecture, in the Law School Auditorium.
Also at the reception, The-Honorable Walter V. Schaefer, JD'28,
Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, talks with The Honorable
Roger Kiley, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh
Circuit.
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At the dinner honoring Judge McGowan, Milton H. Cohen and
Hammond E. Chaffetz consult the seating list.
A Staff for the Center
An earlier issue of the Record reported the establish­
ment of the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice at
the Law School. NORVAL MORRIS, Julius Kreeger Pro­
fessor of Law and Criminology, is Director of the Center.
In recent months, a number of significant appointments
have been made to the staff of the Center.
HANS W . MATTICK has become Associate Director of
the Center. Mr. Mattick, who received a Master of Arts
degree in Sociology from the University in 1956, has
served as Assistant Warden of the Cook County Jail, as
Lecturer in Sociology at Indiana University and, most
recently, as Director of the Chicago Youth Develop­
ment Project, an action-research project in delinquency
sponsored by the Institute for Social Research 'of the
University of Michigan and the Chicago Boys Clubs.
Mr. Mattick is a past president of the Illinois Academy
of Criminology and has contributed extensively to the
literature of his field.
OLIVER J. KELLER, JR., has been appointed a Research
Fellow at the Center. Mr. Keller is a PhD. candidate in
the Committee on Human Development of the Univer­
sity. He has served as Chairman of the Illinois Youth
Commission and as a Special Fellow of the National
Institute of Mental Health.
ANTHONY M. PLATT is the second newly appointed
Research Fellow. Mr. Platt, A.B. in Law, Oxford Uni­
versity, 1963, will have received the Doctor of Crimin­
ology from the University of California, Berkeley, by
the time this appears. He has served as a Research As­
sistant at the School of Criminology of that University
and has already seen the publication of six of his
articles.
ATSUSHI NAGASHIMA will spend the greater part of
the academic year 1966-67 as a Senior Fellow at the
Center. Mr. Nagashima, who has had extensive exper­
ience as a public prosecutor, has served also as Chief
Counselor to the Criminal Affairs Bureau. He is now
the Chief of Secretariat of the Ministry of Justice of
Japan. Mr. Nagashima participated in the revision of
the Penal Code of Japan, and has published extensively
in both Japanese and English.
DR. GEORG STURUP will be a Visiting Scholar at the
Center during at least two quarters of the academic
year 1966-67. A psychiatrist, Dr. Sturup is internation­
ally known as the Director of the Herstetvester Deten­
tion Institute, located near Copenhagen, Denmark.
A representative group from among the more than forty graduate
students enrolled at the Law School in 1965-66.
The Board of the Law Student Association, 1965-66, left to right,
standing: David W. Ellis, Vicksburg, Miss., Class of '67; William
H. Horton, Chicago, Class of '67; Dennis M. DeLeo, Rochester,
N.Y., Class of '66; David L. Passman, Chicago, Class of '67; Keith
E. Eastin, Chicago, Class of '67; and Joseph V. Karaganis, Rose­
mont, Ill., President, Class of '66. Left to right, seated: Steven L.
Clark, Bloomington, Ind., Class of '68, and Linda J. Thoren, St.
Paul, Minn., Class of '67. Not shown, John N. Tierney, Chicago,
Class of '68, and Janet E. Roede, La Grange, Ill., Class of '68.
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Conference on the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
Readers of the Record may recall references in earlier issues to the Conference on Consumer Credit and the Poor, which
was held in the Autumn Quarter, 1965. That Conference was planned and administered entirely by law students. It
set so successful a precedent that again this year there will be a student-run conference. The topic chosen is the landlord­
tenant relationship. In explanation of the need for, and purpose of, the conference, the student planning committee has
written:
"Recent efforts to improve the conditions of urban life have made it apparent that the shortage of decent housing for
families of low and moderate income presents one of the most pressing problems facing the urban poor. While basi­
cally this is an economic problem, the importance of the legal relationship between landlord and tenant cannot be ignored.
Although extension of legal services to the poor has brought the promise that tenants' rights can be effectively en­
forced, it has become clear that often inadequate attention has been given to the substantive law affecting indigent
persons. The law of landlord-tenant, developed in a different context to meet different social goals, has in many
instances proven unsuited for the needs of modern urban society. If 'equal justice under law' is to become a reality for
the urban poor, there must be development and change in the substantive law governing the landlord-tenant relation­
ship.
Modeled on last year's successful Conference on Consumer Credit and the Poor, this Conference will discuss the legal
relationship between landlord and tenant, noting particularly those changes which promise to alter our traditional view
of that relationship. The Conference is intended for those who have a working interest in the law affecting urban
housing. Discussion will center on the efforts by government and the tenants themselves to find solutions to the short­
comings of the present relationship. Hopefully, the Conference will provide a forum in which both landlords and
those providing legal aid for the indigent can express their views and work toward solutions."
The general theme of the opening session, at which papers will be presented, will be "New Approaches to Changing
the Landlord-Tenant Relationship." The speakers and their topics will be:
Commentators will include:
GARY BELLOW, Deputy Director, California Rural Legal RICHARD H. NEWHOUSE, Community Renewal Founda-
Assistance tion; Chicago
JOHN E. COONS, Professor of Law, Northwestern Uni- EUGENE SMOLENSKY, Associate Professor, Graduate
versity; Chicago School of Business, The University of Chicago
Two Workshop Sessions will also be featured. The first, on the general topic of "Tenant Initiated Remedies," will fo­
cus on issues raised in the following papers:
THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND, by GEOF­
FREY A. BRAUN
RENT WITHHOLDING, by EDWARD H. FLITTON
TENANT UNIONS
GILBERT CORNFIELD, Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman;
Chicago
PUBLIC HOUSING
NANCY E. LEBLANC, Assistant Director, Legal Services
Unit, Mobilization for Youth; New York
BUILDING CODE ENFORCEMENT
JULIAN H. LEVI, Professor of Urban Studies, The Uni­
versity of Chicago
LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. MANN, Chairman, Legisla­
tive Housing Commission, Illinois General Assembly
TENANT UNIONS, by PEGGY A. HILLMAN
THE MODEL LEASE, by WILLIAM J. BOWE
The topic of the Second Workshop is "Governmental and Institutional Entry into the Field." The working papers will
be:
REMEDIES THROUGH PRIVATE INSTITU- THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND LOW
TIONS, by ARTHUR W. FRIEDMAN
RECEIVERSHIPS, by CHARLES M. PRATT
RENT HOUSING, by EDWARD A. CHRISTIANSEN
RENT WITHHOLDING II, by EDWARD H. FLITTON
All Workshop papers are being prepared by law students, who will also lead the Workshop discussions. The papers
will be sent out to Conference registrants in advance, so that all participating will have had an opportunity to read
them before the Conference, which will be held on November 17-18.
The student executive committee engaged in planning the Conference is made up of BERNARDINE R. DOHRN, PHILIP N.
HABLUTZEL, PHILIP W. MOORE, and FRANK E. WOOD. Further details and registration blanks may be secured from
the Law School, 1111 East 60th Street, Chicago 60637.
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